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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1986, with Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty,' the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia embarked on a course which has
radically changed the face of West Virginia first party insurance Practice. The
decision in Hayseeds spawned a line of cases2 which now serve as a common law
framework for regulating insurance company conduct in the settlement of first party
352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).
2 See Landmark Baptist Church v. Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Co., 484 S.E.2d 195 (1997); McCormick
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 475 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1996); Hadom v. Shea, 456 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1995);
Marshall v. Saseen, 450 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1994); Jordan v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 393 S.E.2d
647 (W. Va. 1990); Thomas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1989).
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insurance claims.3 The import of these cases is that it is now possible for insurance
consumers to receive extra-contractual damages when they fall prey to insurance
company misconduct in the claims settlement process. The extra-contractual
damages available to the insured under these circumstances include attorney's fees,4
damages for annoyance and inconvenience, damages for net economic loss,6
punitive damages,7 and the amount of a jury verdict in excess of the applicable
policy limits.' The specific damages awarded will usually be dictated by the form
or degree of misconduct the insurance company engaged in when denying or
undervaluing the insured's claim. Moreover, there is a strict liability standard,
established in Hayseeds, to be applied in awarding attorney's fees, damages for
annoyance and inconvenience, and damages for net economic loss? Thus, in
determining if an insured is entitled to these specific damages, "it [is] of little
importance whether an insurer contests an insured's claim in good or bad faith."'
Given the significant financial implications presented by Hayseeds and its
progeny, practicing West Virginia attorneys, whether engaged in representing the
insured or the insurer, are well advised to take careful notice of the decisions in
these cases. Consequently, the purpose of this Note is to explore the various issues
3 There are two other lines of West Virginia cases dealing with insurance company misconduct in the
claims settlement process. For cases dealing with the insured's cause of action against the insurer for
failure to settle a third-party claim within policy limits, see Charles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
452 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1994); State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Karl, 437 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1993);
Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1990). For cases discussing insureds'
and third party claimants' private causes of action under the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act,
see Maher v. Continental Cas. Co., 852 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. W. Va. 1994); McCormick v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 475 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1996); State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d
721 (W. Va. 1994); Russell v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 433 S.E.2d 532 (W. Va. 1993); Thompson v. West
Virginia Essential Property Ins. Ass'n, 411 S.E.2d 27 (W. Va. 1991); Robinson v. Continental Cas.
Co., 406 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1991); Grove v. Myers, 382 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989); Jenkins v. J.C.
Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981).
4 See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80.
5id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 80-81.
' See Marshall v. Saseen, 450 S.E.2d 791, 798 (W. Va. 1994).
9 See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 79. See also McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 475 S.E.2d 507, 514 (W.
Va. 1996).
'0 Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at79.
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presented by the Hayseeds line of cases and to examine the Supreme Court of
Appeals' unique approach to managing insurance company misconduct in the first
party insurance context. This Note will not examine all of the various forms of
misconduct an insurance company might engage in," nor will it present an
exhaustive discussion of all the various remedies available to the insured when an
insurer refuses to settle a claim. Instead, the focus of the Note will be limited to the
type of insurance company misconduct that leads to an award of "substantially
prevailed" damages.'
2
The Note begins with an overview of the various classifications of
insurance. The distinction between first party and third party insurance will be
discussed, as well as the impact that such a classification can have on an insured's
right to recovery.
In Part II of the Note, the American rule on attorney's fees will be
discussed. The American rule provides that each party to a lawsuit is responsible
for its respective attorney's fees. 3
Part III of the Note presents a summary of the leading cases that have
developed West Virginia's unique doctrine of substantially prevailed. 4 The
summary begins with Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty.5 Hayseeds
establishes the substantially prevailed doctrine and sets forth the damages an
insured is permitted to recover if he or she is deemed to have substantially
prevailed. 6 Because Hayseeds involved a property damage claim, the doctrine of
substantially prevailed originally applied only to such claims.7 However, when the
I For a comprehensive discussion of insurance company misconduct in West Virginia, see Thomas
V. Flaherty et al., Developments in West Virginia's Insurance Bad Faith Law-Where Do We Go From
Here?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 267 (1995).
,1 These damages are limited to attorney's fees, damages for annoyance and inconvenience, and
damages for net economic loss. See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 74.
'3 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
'4 See Landmark Baptist Church v. Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Co., 484 S.E.2d 195 (1997); McCormick
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 475 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1996); Hadom v. Shea, 456 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1995);
Marshall v. Saseen, 450 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va 1994); Jordan v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 393 S.E.2d
647 (W. Va. 1990); Thomas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1989);
Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 74.
15 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).
16 See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 74; Thomas, 383 S.E.2d at 786-87.
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Supreme Court of Appeals was presented with different types of first party claims,
the court extended the concept outside of the property damage realm to all first
party insurance claims. 8
Finally, Part IV of the Note will discuss the major issues and questions
presented by the Supreme Court of Appeals development of the substantially
prevailed doctrine. The discussion will focus on the Supreme Court of Appeals'
failure to adopt a purely mathematical calculation for determining if the insured has
substantially prevailed. In addition, the two standards that the Supreme Court of
Appeals has enunciated for determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded
will be analyzed. Finally, Part IV will propose specific solutions to the issues and
questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court of Appeals' decisions in Hayseeds
and its progeny.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Classifications of Insurance
Insurance law contains a multitude of classifications. 9  Some
classifications, such as fire, health, and homeowners insurance, are based on the
nature of the risk against which the policyholder is being insured.2 Insurance can
also be classified according to the parties who seek recovery under the policy.
Classification based on the parties seeking recovery is referred to as first party or
third party insurance.
Many times the classification of insurance impacts the rights or remedies
the claimant or the insured has under the insurance policy in question.2,' For
example, in West Virginia the insured generally is entitled to recover from his or
's See Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 797 (extending substantially prevailed damages to uninsured and
underinsured motorist claims); Hadorn, 456 S.E.2d at 196 (confirming implication in Marshall that
substantially prevailed damages are available in all first party insurance claims). See also Jordan, 393
S.E.2d at 647 (extending substantially prevailed damages to cases where the insured and insurer
ultimately settle).
19 See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 1.4, at 16 (Student ed. 1988).
20 Id. § 1.5(a)(1), at 18.
21 Id. § 1.4, at 16-17.
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her insurer the actual cash value' of damages incurred to his or her property.23
Accordingly, the insured who has procured collision insurance on his or her
automobile is entitled to recover from the insurer the actual cash value of damages
incurred to the insured vehicle.24 However, when an individual purchases fire
insurance on real estate located in West Virginia, actual cash value is not used to
determine the recovery under the policy. Instead, under West Virginia's valued
policy law' the insured is entitled to recover the full face value of the insurance
policy in the event the real estate is completely destroyed by fire.26 As an example,
an insured with a $100,000 fire policy on their home recovers the full face value of
the policy if the home is completely destroyed by fire. The actual cash value of the
damage to the home is irrelevant and the insured recovers the full $100,000
regardless of the value of the home or the cost to repair it.
The classification relevant to substantially prevailed damages is first party
insurance.2 As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted in Marshall
v. Saseen, first party insurance occurs when an "insurance carrier has directly
contracted with the insured to provide coverage and to reimburse the insured for his
or her damages up to the policy limits."'28 Therefore, in the first party insurance
context, it is the insured, not a third party claimant, who seeks to recover under the
policy. Even though first party insurance is a classification unto itself, it can be
further classified by the nature of the risk being insured against.29 The most
22 Generally, the actual cash value is the difference between the fair market value of the property
immediately before the damage and the fair market value after the damage. KEETON & WIDISS, supra
note 19, § 3.9(a), at 208, n.2. In many cases the actual cash value will be the cost necessary to repair
the damaged property. See Checker Leasing, Inc. v. Sorbello, 382 S.E.2d 36, 37 (W. Va. 1989);
Jarrett v. E.L. Harper & Son, Inc., 235 S.E.2d 362 (1977).
' See Board of Educ. of Hancock County v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 19 S.E.2d 448, 450 (W. Va. 1942).
24 See Sorbello, 382 S.E.2d at 38, n.l.
25 See W. VA. CODE § 33-17-9 (1996). See also Filiatreau v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 S.E.2d 829, 832
(W. Va. 1987) (stating that the valued policy statute may result in a windfall for the insured).
11 If the fire causes only a partial loss to the real estate in question, the insured is entitled to recover
for the total amount of the partial loss. See W. VA. CODE § 33-17-9 (1996).
27 See Marshall v. Saseen, 450 S.E.2d 791, 797 (W. Va. 1994); Hadom v. Shea, 456 S.E.2d 194, 196
(W. Va. 1995).
28 Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 797 (emphasis added).
29 Third party insurance can also be further classified according to the risk being insured against. One
of the most common forms of third party insurance is liability insurance on an automobile.
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common forms of first party insurance are disability, homeowners, health, fire, and
uninsured/underinsured motorist.3"
Third party insurance, on the other hand, involves the insurance carrier, the
insured, and generally a third party claimant. In contrast to first party insurance
where the insured attempts to collect under the policy, in third party insurance a
party other than the insured seeks to recover proceeds under the insurance policy.
Here, the third party or her property has usually been injured by the insured, and the
third party is making a claim for damages under the insurance policy purchased by
the insured.
The distinction between first party insurance and third party insurance is
readily apparent when the ramifications of insurance company misconduct are
observed from both standpoints." For example, in the third party context if the
insured's liability carrier refuses to settle with an injured claimant and the claimant
sues to collect damages, the possibility arises that the insured may become
personally liable to the claimant if a judgment in excess of the applicable policy
limits is returned. 2 This occurs because an insurance carrier is only liable up to
policy limits for a judgment against its insured, and any verdict in excess of those
limits may subject the insured to personal liability for the excess amount.33
Therefore, in the third party insurance context an insurer's refusal to settle has the
potential to expose the insured to personal liability.
As discussed previously, in the first party insurance context it is the insured
who seeks to recover damages from the insurer. Therefore, first party insurance
does not have the potential to expose the insured to personal liability when the
insurer refuses to settle a claim.34 However, when an insurer refuses to settle with
its insured and the insured must file suit to enforce his or her rights under the
3 Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage is frequently referred to as a hybrid of first party and
third party insurance. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 4.9(e), at 399. For purposes of
substantially prevailed damages, however, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated
that uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages are first party insurance. See Marshall, 450 S.E.2d
at 797.
31 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 7.9, at 906.
32 Id. See also 2 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 5A.0 1, at 5A-2 (1997).
" But see Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990) (adopting a
negligence-strict liability standard for allowing the insured to recover from the insurer the amount of
a jury verdict which is in excess of the applicable policy limits).
31 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 7.9, at 906-07.
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policy, the insured still suffers harm' For example, the insured must hire an
attorney in order to receive the benefits of the insurance contract and, even when
the attorney is successful in achieving recovery for the insured, the insured's net
proceeds are reduced by the amount paid to the attorney?6 In these situations, the
insured suffers a financial loss equal to the amount of the attorney's fees. 7 In
addition, the insured may suffer other economic harm associated with the delay in
receiving the policy proceeds from the insurer. For instance, if a shop owner's store
is destroyed and the store cannot be rebuilt immediately because the insurer has
refused to pay, the shop owner loses not only the sales she would have had during
the period the insurer refused to pay, but she may also suffer irreparable harm to her
reputation and goodwill.
B The American Rule
In the United States, the general rule is that each party to a civil action bears
its respective attorney's fees regardless of the outcome of the litigation?' The
premise underlying this American rule39 is that a party should not be deterred from
enforcing her legal rights because of the possibility that the opponents' attorney's
fees will be levied against her.4 The routine awarding of attorney's fees to a
prevailing party could have the chilling effect of limiting access to the judicial
system to those parties best able to afford the imposition of the opposing party's
attorney's fees.4
Although the general rule is that attorney's fees are not awarded to the
prevailing party, there are exceptions to this rule. For example, there are numerous
federal statutes that specifically allow an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing
In d. at 907.
36 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d 156, 160 (W. Va. 1986).
37 Id.
31 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
11 This is referred to as the American rule because it is in direct contrast to the practice in England
where the prevailing litigant is routinely awarded his or her attorney's fees. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at
247; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
40 See Fleischmann Distilling, 386 U.S. at 718; Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 365 S.E.2d 246, 249-
50 (W. Va. 1986); Daily Gazette Company, Inc. v. Canady, 332 S.E.2d 262, 265 (W. Va. 1985).
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party.4 2 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has carved out its own
exceptions to the American rule: a litigant may recover attorney's fees from the
opposing party when the opponent has deliberately acted in violation of a court
order,43 when the opponent has proceeded in bad faith," and when the prevailing
party's success creates a common fund for a class.45
For many years, the American rule equally applied in insurance law.46
Therefore, when an insurer refused to settle with its insured and the insured
subsequently prevailed at trial, the insured could not recover his or her attorney's
fees.47 In response to this inequity, many state legislatures enacted statutes that
allow the insured to recover attorney's fees when the insurer wrongfully or
unreasonably refuses to pay an insured's claim.48 In addition, the courts in many
jurisdictions have carved out their own exceptions to the American rule, and the
insured may now recover attorney's fees when the insurance company has refused
payment in bad faith or has acted in an oppressive manner.49
Generally, West Virginia has followed the American rule and not allowed
42 See generally Packers & Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1994); Perishable Agricultural
Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499(g)(b) (1994); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1994); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1994);
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. 11995); Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1994); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1994); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (d) (1994); Fair Housing
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(p) (1994); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1227
(1994); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2).
41 See Fleischmann Distilling, 386 U.S. at 718; Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S.
399 (1923).
44 See F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974);
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
41 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973).
46 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 7.7(a), at 866.
47 Id.
48 Id. § 7.7(b), at 868. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-208 (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.911 (West 1996); IDAHO CODE § 41-1839(1) (1991 & Supp 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420
(West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-359 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-59-40 (Law Co-op. 1997).
41 See generally Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 557 F.2d 51 (3rd Cir. 1977);
Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Christian v. American
Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
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prevailing parties in a civil action to recover their attorney's fees. More
specifically, the rule in West Virginia is that in the absence of a statute or judicially
created rule, the prevailing party is not entitled to collect attorney's fees from the
other party5 However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has carved
out various exceptions that allow the prevailing party to recover their attorney's fees
from the other side. For example, in Nelson v. West Virginia Public Employees
Insurance Board, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that a prevailing party is
entitled to recover attorney's fees when the losing party "has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."'" Moreover, in Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Pitrolo,52 the Supreme Court of Appeals allowed an insured to
recover attorney's fees from an insurer when the insurer filed a declaratory
judgment action to determine its duty to defend the insuredYa Finally, the Supreme
Court of Appeals' decision in Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty creates
another exception to the American rule: under certain circumstances, an insured
may recover attorney's fees, as well as extra-contractual damages, that result from
the insurer's failure to pay a claim.54
III. SUBSTANTIALLY PREVAILED DAMAGES
A. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
The landmark West Virginia case which established the substantially
prevailed doctrine is Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty.55 Substantially
prevailed damages, sometimes called "Hayseeds damages," are restricted to first
" See Yost v. Fuscaldo, 408 S.E.2d 72, 78 (W. Va. 1991); Old Nat'l Bank of Martinsburg v.
Hendricks, 383 S.E.2d 502, 507 (W. Va. 1989); Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 365 S.E.2d 246,248
(W. Va. 1986); Hechler v. Casey, 333 S.E.2d 799, 815 (W. Va. 1985); Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v.
Canady, 332 S.E.2d 262, 263 (W. Va. 1985); Nelson v. West Virginia Pub. Employees Ins. Bd., 300
S.E.2d 86, 91 (W. Va. 1982).
"' Nelson, 300 S.E.2d at 92.
52 342 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1986).
" The impact Pitrolo had on West Virginia's version of the American rule is discussed in more detail
in Part III of the Note.
54 See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).
15 Id. at 73.
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party" insurance claims57 in which an insurance company has denied or
undervalued an insured's claim and as a result the insured is forced to institute a
lawsuit.5" If an insured is deemed to have substantially prevailed under the
guidelines set forth in Hayseeds and its progeny, he or she is entitled to recover
from the insurer his or her attorney's fees, as well as the other consequential
damages 9 incurred in vindicating his or her claim.
Although Hayseeds established the substantially prevailed doctrine, and
made it possible for the insured to recover his or her attorney's fees, this was not
the first time the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had held that an award
of attorney's fees was appropriate in an insurance action."' For example, in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, the Supreme Court of Appeals held: "Where a
declaratory judgment action is filed to determine whether an insurer has a duty to
defend its insured under its policy, if the insurer is found to have such a duty, its
insured is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees arising from the declaratory
judgment litigation."' Although the Pitrolo holding was limited by its facts to
declaratory judgment actions, the Hayseeds court relied heavily on the reasoning of
that opinion in extending the recovery of attorney's fees to the first party insurance
context.62
In Hayseeds, the insureds sued their insurance carrier to recover the
proceeds of a fire policy they had procured on their restaurant.63 The carrier refused
payment on the policy because the insureds were suspected of starting the fire that
56 See supra Part II.A for a discussion on insurance classifications.
" Because the facts of Hayseeds only dealt with a property damage claim, the principle of substantially
prevailed damages originally applied only to such damage claims. See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 74.
The Supreme Court of Appeals later extended substantially prevailed damages to all first party
insurance. See infra Part III.D for the discussion on Marshall v. Saseen, 450 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va.
1994).
58 See Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 797; Hadorn v. Shea, 456 S.E.2d 194, 196 (W. Va. 1995).
5 The consequential damages allowed are damages for annoyance and inconvenience and damages
for net economic loss. See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80.
60 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1986).
61 Id. at 159-60.
62 See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 79.
63 Id. at 74.
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had destroyed the restaurant." The insureds brought suit in the Circuit Court of
Mason County and the jury awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages, $69,000
in attorney's fees and consequential damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held: "Whenever a
policyholder substantially prevails in a property damage suit against its insurer, the
insurer is liable for: (1) the insured's reasonable attorneys' fees in vindicating its
claim; (2) the insured's damages for net economic loss caused by the delay in
settlement, and damages for aggravation and inconvenience. 66
In affirming the jury verdict for compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and
consequential damages,67 the court discussed numerous factors in support of its
decision. First, the court noted that insurance contracts are "substantially different"
in form than contracts between two parties of equal bargaining power Second,
the court noted that many other organizations and individuals, such as lenders and
suppliers, also rely on the insured's agreement with the insurer to provide protection
in the case of a fire or other damage to the insured's property.69 Third, the court
acknowledged that the use of the American rule was appropriate in many
circumstances, but in the insurance context it was not applicable because third
parties rely on the insured's policy and the insured is usually in an unequal
bargaining position with the insurer.7"
It should also be noted that the Hayseeds court adopted a strict liability
approach to awarding substantially prevailed damages?' Bad faith or good faith on
the part of the insurer, in denying or undervaluing the insured's claim, is irrelevant
to an award of substantially prevailed damages.72 Again relying on Aetna Casualty
" Id. at 75.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 74, Syl. Pt. 1.
67 The jury award for punitive damages was reversed, but the Supreme Court of Appeals did espouse
a standard for determining when such damages are appropriate in a first party insurance claim. See
Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80-81.
60 Id. at 78.
69 Id. at 77.
'0 Id. at 78-79.
", Id. at 79.
72 See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 79.
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& Surety Co. v. Pitrolo73, the Hayseeds court stated "it [is] of little importance
whether an insurer contests an insured's claim in good or bad faith. In either case,
the insured is out his consequential damages and attorney's fees. 74
The Hayseeds court also discussed the amount of attorney's fees the insured
may recover when he or she substantially prevails. Accordingly, the Hayseeds court
held:
Presumptively, reasonable attorneys' fees in this type of case are
one-third of the face amount of the policy, unless the policy is
either extremely small or enormously large. This follows from the
contingent nature of most representation of this sort and the fact
that the standard contingent fee is 33 percent. But when a claim is
for under $20,000 or for over $1,000,000 (to take numbers that are
applicable in 1986) the court should then inquire concerning what
"reasonable attorneys' fees" are.75
Although the court did not specifically state the standard for what reasonable
attorney's fees are when the claim is under $20,000 or over $1,000,000, Pitrolo
again gives some guidance in this inquiry. Pitrolo provides twelve factors26 for a
3 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1986).
7 Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 79.
73 Id. at 80.
76 Pitrolo provides in pertinent part:
Where attorney's fees are sought against a third party, the test of what should be
considered a reasonable fee is determined not solely by the fee arrangement
between the attorney and his client. The reasonableness of attorney's fees is
generally based on broader factors such as: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases.
Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d at 157, Syl. Pt. 4.
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court to consider in determining an appropriate award of attorney's fees.77
B. The Substantially Prevailed Standard
The second significant case in the substantially prevailed line is Thomas v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.." In Thomas, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia reiterated the damages available to an insured who has
substantially prevailed, while also enunciating what appears to be a standard for
determining if the insured has substantially prevailed.
In Thomas, the insured was involved in an automobile accident that resulted
in damage to a truck used in her business.79 After the accident, the insured
submitted damage estimates to the insurer in the amount of $10,231.05.!' The
insurer countered with a damage estimate of $4,960.72 and offered to settle for that
amount.8 ' The insured refused this offer and filed suit in the Circuit Court of
Mercer County asking for $10,465.50 in property damage as well as $359 for
towing charges.12 At trial, the jury awarded the insured $10,168 for property
damages and towing and storage, as well as $3,045 for economic loss.83 In addition,
the circuit court awarded attorney's fees equal to one-third of the jury verdict.84
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia upheld the
circuit court's award of attorney's fees while also giving some indication of what
constitutes substantially prevailed. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that "[t]he
' See also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Farley v. Zapata
Coal Corp., 281 S.E.2d 238, 244 (W. Va. 1981); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
2-106(B) (1981).
78 383 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1989).
71 See Id. at 787.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 787-88.
83 See Thomas, 383 S.E.2d at 787-88.
84 Id. at 787-88. In a footnote to the Thomas opinion the Supreme Court of Appeals acknowledged
that the circuit court had awarded attorney's fees equal to one-third of the jury verdict instead of one-
third of the policy amount. See Thomas, 383 S.E.2d at 788, n.2. It appears from the language of the
footnote that the Thomas court was holding, sub silentio, that when a jury verdict less than the policy
limits is returned, the appropriate attorney's fees to be awarded are one-third of such verdict.
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phrase 'substantially prevails' relates to the status of the property damage claim at
the time the negotiations broke down." 5 The Thomas court elaborated on this
statement by further holding:
The question of whether an insured has substantially prevailed
against his insurance company on a property damage claim is
determined by the status of the negotiations between the insured
and the insurerprior to the institution of the lawsuit. Where the
insurance company has offered an amount materially below the
damage estimates submitted by the insured, and the jury awards the
insured an amount approximating the insured's damage estimates,
the insured has substantially prevailed.86
Taking these two statements together, it is apparent that the last demand by the
insured and the last offer by the insurer, prior to suit being instituted, are key in
determining if the insured has substantially prevailed. Furthermore, once the last
demand and offer have been identified, it must be determined if the insurer's last
offer was materially below the damage estimates of the insured and if the jury
verdict approximates such damage estimates.
Given the amounts offered by the insurer and the damage estimates of the
insured, it was clear that the insured in Thomas had substantially prevailed.87
However, as discussed in more detail in Part IV of this Note, the standard espoused
by the Thomas court is too vague and elastic for efficient application in many cases.
The facts of every case may not always be as clear-cut as those presented in
Thomas, and it may not be so readily apparent that the insured has substantially
prevailed. For example, when the jury verdict is in a middle range between the
insured's damage estimates and the insurer's last offer, the standard espoused in
Thomas is not easily applied and it is not clear if the insured has substantially
prevailed. In these situations, it can be argued that the verdict approximates the
insurer's last offer, not the insured's last demand. Moreover, the standard set forth
in Thomas creates an all or nothing proposition for the insurer and insured. The
insured receives either all of the attorney's fees or nothing at all. Likewise, the
insurer either pays no attorney's fees or it pays the full amount. When there is a
" Thomas, 383 S.E.2d at 790.
16 Id. at 787, Syl. Pt. 2 (emphasis added).
87 The damage estimates of the insured were only one hundred dollars more than the jury verdict so
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close call as to whether the insured substantially prevailed, it does not appear
equitable that one party is declared the clear winner and the other party is declared
the clear loser.
C. Substantially Prevailed in the Settlement Context
The third important case in the substantially prevailed line is Jordan v.
National Grange Mutual Insurance Co..88 The decision in Jordan represented the
most significant extension of the substantially prevailed doctrine up to this point.
In Jordan, the insureds sought recovery under an insurance policy covering their
business.89 After the business was destroyed by fire, the insureds demanded
payment of the policy limits of $40,000 0 The insurer rejected the demand and
denied any recovery under the policy based on the insured's alleged concealment
and misrepresentation of material facts surrounding the fire.9! ' The insureds then
filed suit seeking the policy limits.92 Before going to trial, however, a settlement
was reached for the policy limits of $40,000. After settlement, the insureds refused
to cash the settlement check and insisted that the insurer pay their attorney's fees.93
The insurer moved to have the settlement enforced, claiming that the $40,000 was
full satisfaction of all claims.' The trial court agreed with the insurer and held that
the insureds were required to "accept the $40,000 settlement as full satisfaction of
all claims, including reasonable attorney's fees. 95
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the
trial court and held that the insureds were entitled to attorney's fees even though the
parties ultimately settled. In extending the substantially prevailed doctrine to cases
where the insurer and insured ultimately settle, the Jordan court held:
88 393 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1990).
8' See id. at 648.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 548.
92 Id.
9' See Jordan, 393 S.E.2d at 648.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 649.
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An insured "substantially prevails" in a property damage action
against his or her insurer when the action is settled for an amount
equal to or approximating the amount claimed by the insured
immediately prior to the commencement of the action, as well as
when the action is concluded by a jury verdict for such an amount.
In either of these situations, the insured is entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees from his or her insurer, as long as the
attorney's services were necessary to obtain payment of the
insurance proceeds.96
After Jordan, it is no longer necessary for the insured to proceed to trial and
receive ajury verdict in order to recover substantially prevailed damages. It should
be noted, however, that unlike the insured who substantially prevails at trial, the
insured who ultimately settles his or her claim must meet two additional
requirements before attorney's fees can be awarded. First, the settlement must not
contain an express waiver of the insured's right to seek attorney's fees. More
specifically, "[t]he recovery of reasonable attorney's fees must be explicitly waived
by the parties to bar the court from awarding such fees in those types of cases where
reasonable attorney's fees are otherwise recoverable."97 Second, the insured must
show that the attorney's services were necessary in achieving the settlement.98 The
fact that an attorney was hired and a settlement was reached is not dispositive in the
settlement context.99 "[T]he insured must show that but for his or her attorney's
services such settlement would not have been reached, in light of the undue delay
in investigating the claim."' '0
In addition to the issues discussed above, the Jordan court also set forth
"the guidelines for the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees in the context of a
settlement with one's own insurer."'' These guidelines are the twelve factors set
out in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo.°2 After the decision in Jordan, there
96 Id. at 647-48, Syl. Pt. I (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 651, n.3.
98 Jordan, 393 S.E.2d at 652.
99 Id.
'o Id. at 652.
... Id. at 648 (emphasis added).
12 342 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1986). See also supra note 76.
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are two standards for determining attorney's fees in a substantially prevailed case.
If the case results in a jury verdict, the one-third presumption enunciated in
Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty3 applies. If the case is ultimately
settled, however, the twelve factors espoused in Pitrolo determine the amount of
attorney's fees to be awarded."'
D. Substantially Prevailed Outside of Property Damage Claims
The next significant extension of the substantially prevailed doctrine
occurred in Marshall v. Saseen.0 5 The significance of Marshall, in the
substantially prevailed context,"' is that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia transported the principles espoused in Hayseeds to uninsured and
underinsured motorist claims. Moreover, the court's detailed discussion of first
party insurance contained strong implications that the substantially prevailed
doctrine applied to all such first party claims.
0 7
In Marshall, the insureds were injured in an automobile accident with
another driver."' The insureds filed suit against the other driver, but before the case
went to trial the other driver's liability carrier settled for the policy limits of
$50,000."'0 The insureds then demanded policy limits of $100,000 from their
underinsured motorist carrier."' The insurer responded with a $10,000 counter-
offer which was rejected."' The case went to trial on the underinsured motorist
303 52 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).
'0' See Jordan, 393 S.E.2d at 652.
,05 450 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1994).
06 Although beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of Appeals
also used Marshall to hold that the third-party "bad faith" principles enunciated in Shamblin v.
Nationwide Insurance Co., 396 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1990), applied to first party insurance cases. See
Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 798. See also Flaherty et al., supra note 11, at 291.
'07 See Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 796-97. See also Hadom v. Shea, 456 S.E.2d 194, 196 (W. Va. 1995).
300 Id. at 793.
309 Id. at 793-94.
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claim and the jury awarded the plaintiffs $226,711.80.112
Prior to being presented with the facts of Marshall, the Supreme Court of
Appeals only had applied the substantially prevailed doctrine to property damage
cases." 3 When presented with the facts of Marshall, however, the court did not
hesitate to extend the substantially prevailed doctrine to uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage. Although the Marshall court "recognized" that the substantially
prevailed doctrine only had been applied in property damage cases, the court went
on to state that there was "no reason why these principles should not apply to
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage." ' " The court's rationale was that
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, as with property damage coverage,
is first party insurance in which "the insurance carrier has directly contracted with
the insured to provide coverage and to reimburse the insured for his or her damages
up to the policy limits.""' 5
E. A Missed Opportunity
The next significant case in the substantially prevailed line is Hadorn v.
Shea."6 The facts in Hadorn are similar to those of Marshall in that the insured
was involved in an automobile accident with a second vehicle and subsequently
sued the other driver."7 As in Marshall, the insured settled with the liability carrier
prior to trial and began to negotiate with the underinsured motorist carrier."'
During the course of negotiations, the insurer offered $15,000 and then $22,500 to
settle the claim. The insured rejected the two offers and both times demanded the
policy limits of $300,000. The insurer refused to pay policy limits, and the insured
proceeded to trial where she was awarded $90,000 by thejury."9 The insured then
112 Id.
"1 See Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d 73; Thomas, 383 S.E.2d 786; Jordan, 393 S.E.2d 647.
"4 Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 797.
115 Id.
116 456 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1995).
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moved for attorney's fees, but the circuit court denied the motion. 2 °
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals in Hadorn stands for three
distinct propositions. First, the Hadorn court reaffirmed the applicability of the
substantially prevailed doctrine to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.'
The Supreme Court of Appeals also confirmed the implication in Marshall that the
substantially prevailed doctrine applied to all first party insurance claims."
Second, the Hadorn court transported the "but for" test, first enunciated in
Jordan v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co.'23 to the jury verdict context.
After restating the "but for" test set forth in Jordan, the Hadorn court held:
It is not clear that "but for" Ms. Hadorn's attorney's services she
would not have been able to get State Farm to settle for $90,000
without proceeding to trial. It is upon this basis that we affirm the
ruling of the Circuit Court and decline to award costs and
expenses, including attorneys' fees against State Farm. 124
In support of this holding, the court noted that had the insured actively participated
in negotiations with the insurer, it may not have been necessary to proceed to
trial."2 Although it is not entirely clear after Hadorn if the insured must actively
participate in negotiations to preserve his or her claim for substantially prevailed
damages, it is clear that the insured must make some showing that the attorney's
services were necessary in ultimately vindicating the claim.
Finally, and most importantly, the Hadorn court gave some guidance on the
standard to be used in determining if the insured has substantially prevailed. More
specifically, the court held that "[t]o determine if a plaintiff has substantially
prevailed, we compare the plaintiff's last settlement demand before filing suit to the
amount awarded by the jury.'2 6 The Hadorn court added that if the jury verdict is
closer to the insurer's last settlement offer than it is to the insured's last demand,
120 Id.
121 See Hadorn, 456 S.E.2d at 196. See also Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 791.
'" See Hadorn, 456 S.E.2d at 196.
123 393 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1990).
114 456 S.E.2d at 197-98.
'2' See id. at 199.
126 Id. at 197.
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this highly favors the insurer.'27 In giving this guidance, however, the Supreme
Court of Appeals stressed that "[w]e are not basing this decision on a purely
mathematical calculation.... .,28 The court noted that even when the jury verdict
is closer to the insurer's last settlement offer than it is to the insured's last demand,
"the insurer does not automatically prevail," and the insured can still "show other
circumstances justifying a contrary result."'29 The court did not elaborate as to what
those other circumstances might be.
F. A Clarification ofAnnoyance and Inconvenience
The next important case in the substantially prevailed line is McCormick
v. Allstate Insurance Co..3' In McCormick, the insured was involved in a collision
with another vehicle and sought to recover damages under his own insurance
policy.' The insurer valued the insured's vehicle, a total loss, at $3100, and, after
making certain adjustments, the insured was sent a check for $1429.50.32 Unhappy
with the settlement, the insured filed suit to collect additional damages under the
policy.' At trial, the insured was awarded $595.00 for the insurer's underpayment
of his damages and $400 for the loss of use of the automobile.'34 The insured filed
a post-trial motion for attorney's fees,'35 but the circuit court denied the motion.3
The significance of McCormick is found in the clarification by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of what damages an insured may collect for aggravation and
inconvenience. Without much discussion on the issue, the McCormick court held:
127 Id. at 198.
128 Id.
129 Hadorn, 456 S.E.2d at 198.




'3 Id. at 512.
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Damages for aggravation and inconvenience in a claim under
Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 177 W. Va. 323,
352 S.E.2d 73 (1986), are not limited to damages associated with
loss of use of the personal property but relate as well to the
aggravation and inconvenience shown in the entire claims
collection process.'37
What the Supreme Court of Appeals made clear in McCormick is that the insured's
damages for aggravation and inconvenience are not limited to the loss of use of their
property during the period in which the insurer refuses to pay the claim. Instead,
the insured may also recover for the aggravation and inconvenience that results
from negotiating with a recalcitrant insurer.
138
It should also be noted that the McCormick court drew a sharp distinction
between the cause of action established in Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty'39 and the insured's private cause of action under the West Virginia Unfair
Trade Practices Act. 41 The court made it clear that the failure of one cause of
action did not necessarily mean the failure of the other. 4' The court's basis for the
distinction was that the Hayseeds cause of action was based on common law and the
Unfair Trade Practices Act cause of action was based on statute. 1
42
G. More Discussions on Attorney's Fees
The final case in the substantially prevailed line is Landmark Baptist
Church v. Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Co.. 43 In Landmark Baptist, the insured
brought suit against its insurer when the two parties were unable to negotiate a
settlement regarding storm damage to the insured's church building! 44 At trial, the
"I Id. at 509, Syl. Pt. 4.
138 Id.
131 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).
140 See W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (1996). See also Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252
(W. Va. 1981).
41 See McCormick 475 S.E.2d at 514.
142 See id. at 519.
143 484 S.E.2d 195 (W. Va. 1997).
144 Id. at 197.
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jury returned a verdict for the insured in the amount of $83,400.' The insured
filed a post-trial motion for attorney's fees, and the circuit court awarded the
insured $49,357.20.46 The insurer appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia on the sole issue of the reasonableness of the attorney's fees
awarded. "
The Supreme Court of Appeals decision in Landmark Baptist is noteworthy
both for what was stated in the court's opinion and what was left out of the opinion.
After reiterating the holding of Hayseeds, the court stated that the standard for
determining reasonable attorney's fees is the twelve factors set forth in Pitrolo. 4 '
Even though the case had concluded in the circuit court with a jury verdict, the
Supreme Court of Appeals made no mention of the one-third presumption that was
enunciated in Hayseeds. It would appear that after the decision in Landmark
Baptist, either the one-third presumption or the twelve factors may be used to
determine the insured's reasonable attorney's fees in a case culminating with a jury
verdict. Which standard is used will likely be dictated by how the insured chooses
to present his or her request for attorney's fees.
The Landmark Baptist court also discussed the trial court's discretion in
determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded the insured. More
specifically, the Court held that the trial court is endowed with wide discretion in
determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded to the insured.'49 The
court added that on appeal the trial court's determination on attorney's fees will be
overturned only if it is clear that the trial court has abused its discretion. 5 °
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Why Not a Purely Mathematical Calculation?
In Thomas v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., the Supreme
145 id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 196.
14 484 S.E.2d at 198.
149 Id. at 199.
150 Id.
... 383 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1989).
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Court of Appeals of West Virginia first set forth the standard for determining if the
insured has substantially prevailed. 52 In Hadorn v. Shea,'53 the Supreme Court of
Appeals took the opportunity to elaborate on the standard enunciated in Thomas.15
4
In discussing this standard, however, the Hadorn court expressly rejected the use
of a purely mathematical calculation for determining if the insured has substantially
prevailed. 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeals introduced additional
uncertainty to the standard by stating that when "an insurer offers a nominal amount
that ends up being closer to the amount awarded by the jury than that demanded by
the plaintiff, the insurer does not automatically prevail, but such a circumstance
highly favors the insurer and the insured must show other circumstances justifying
a contrary result."'56
In refusing to adopt a purely mathematical calculation for determining if the
insured has substantially prevailed, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
missed the perfect opportunity to introduce consistency, impartiality, and fairness
in to the substantially prevailed doctrine. Therefore, it is submitted that the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopt a purely mathematical
calculation for determining if the insured has substantially prevailed. More
specifically, a relative, sliding-scale model should be adopted for determining if the
insured has substantially prevailed.
As with the current substantially prevailed standard, a relative model would
award attorney's fees to the insured based on the amount offered by the insurer, the
amount demanded by the insured, and the amount recovered at trial or in settlement.
A relative model, however, would award the insured a percentage of his or her
attorney's fees based on the relationship between the insurer's offer, the insured's
demand, and the amount ultimately recovered by the insured. Using these three
figures, a percentage would be calculated to determine what portion of the insured's
attorney's fees are to be awarded. A hypothetical example illustrates the
implementation of this relative model. On January 1, 1998, insured's building is
damaged by a hurricane. After lengthy negotiations, the insurer and insured are
unable to settle the matter, so the insured files suit to recover her damages. At trial,
the jury awards the insured $150,000 in damages. After a post-trial motion for
attorney's fees is filed, the circuit court determines that the insurer's last offer, prior
"' See supra Part III.B for discussion on Thomas.
153 456 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1995).
154 See supra Part III.E for discussion on Hadorn.
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to suit being filed, was $100,000, and the insured's last demand was $200,000.
Based on these figures, the circuit court takes the difference between the jury
verdict and the insurer's last offer, $50,000, and divides that figure by the amount
of the insurer's last offer, $100,000. The court would then apply the percentage
arrived at in performing this calculation, in this case fifty percent, to the amount of
attorney's fees the insured incurred. In the hypothetical, the insured would receive
half of the attorney's fees she incurred in litigating the matter.'57 In circumstances
in which the jury verdict is below the last offer by the insurer, no attorney's fees
would be awarded. Similarly, when the jury verdict is above the insured's last
demand, the insured would be entitled to all of her attorney's fees.
58
The use of a relative model provides several benefits. First, a relative
model eliminates the winner takes all proposition associated with the current
standard. The insured is awarded a percentage of his or her attorney's fees relative
to the degree of vindication received at trial or in settlement. Second, the model
provides a concrete standard that is open to little interpretation. At the conclusion
of the litigation, the parties to the suit clearly know the outcome of the attorney's
fees issue and there is a reduced need for review of the circuit court's decision.
Finally, the model promotes predictability in the application of the substantially
prevailed standard. The insurer and insured can estimate the amount they have at
risk more accurately prior to deciding whether to proceed to trial and make better
informed decisions concerning the insurance claim.
B. What are Reasonable Attorney's Fees?
Once it is determined that the insured has substantially prevailed, the focus
turns to the proper amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. As discussed
previously, there are currently two standards for determining the amount of
attorney's fees to be awarded. If the insured has substantially prevailed in the
settlement context, the twelve factors set forth in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Pitrolo, 5 9 are utilized."W When the insured substantially prevails at trial, however,
' See infra Part IV.B for discussion on determining the amount of reasonable attorney's fees.
15' The relative model would be equally applicable in situations where the insured and insurer
ultimately settle before going to trial.
159 342 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1986).
160 See Jordan v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 393 S.E.2d 647, 652 (W. Va. 1990). The use of the
twelve factors is also mandated in the jury verdict context when the insurance policy in question is
below $20,000 or above $1,000,000. See Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73,
80 (W. Va. 1986).
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either the one-third presumption enunciated in Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty6' may be used or the twelve factors of Pitrolo may be used.162
The use of the one-third presumption raises some concerns which should
be addressed. Chief among these concerns is the fact that the use of the one-third
presumption is directly contrary to most West Virginia case law on the subject of
awarding attorney's fees. In Hayseeds, Justice Neely expressly founded the one-
third presumption on the fact that most property damage claims are taken on a
contingency fee basis and the standard contingency fee is thirty-three percent. 63 In
Pitrolo, however, the Supreme Court of Appeals expressly held that "the test of
what should be considered a reasonable fee is determined not solely by the fee
arrangement between the attorney and his client. The reasonableness of attorney's
fees is generally based on broader factors .... ."'6' The Supreme Court of Appeals
reiterated these principles when it adopted the twelve factors of Pitrolo for
substantially prevailed cases in which the insured settles with the insurer. 65
It is submitted that the better rule for determining attorney's fees, in both
the jury verdict and settlement context, is the Pitrolo standard. This conclusion is
based on several factors. First, the twelve factors permit the trial court to award
attorney's fees based on the insured's actual damages, as well as the type and
amount of work actually performed by the attorney. The insured and the attorney
should be made to substantiate the time and effort expended on the case so that an
accurate assessment of the insured's damages is determined. Moreover, the face
value of the insured's policy is irrelevant to the actual damages sustained and, in
many cases, creates the potential for a windfall to the insured and attorney.
Second, the use of the twelve factors in all substantially prevailed cases
provides a fair and uniform framework for awarding reasonable attorney's fees.
Once it is determined that the insured has substantially prevailed, the inquiry
proposed by the Pitrolo standard is begun, and the court can determine a fair and
reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Although the fee arrangement between the
insured and the attorney is part of the inquiry, it is not the sole determining factor.
The court must consider numerous other factors in awarding the insured his or her
attorney's fees. Moreover, the use of one standard, the Pitrolo standard, provides
uniformity and consistency in the awarding of attorney's fees. The same standard,
161 Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 80.
262 See supra Part III.G.
263 See id.
'6 Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d at 161 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
265 See Jordan, 393 S.E.2d at 652.
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and the same twelve factors, are used to determine the insured's recovery, and it is
irrelevant whether he or she went to trial or ultimately settled.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has taken a major step
toward leveling the playing field between insurers and insureds. The development
of the substantially prevailed doctrine provides serious financial ramifications for
insurance companies that do not proceed fairly in the claims settlement process. It
is suggested, however, that certain refinements are needed to provide a more
consistent, uniform, and even-handed application of the doctrine. A purely
mathematical calculation for determining if the insured has substantially prevailed
is one such refinement for providing consistency, uniformity, and fairness.
Adopting the twelve factors of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo,'66 for use in
all substantially prevailed cases, will also increase uniformity and consistency as
well as provide a more rational basis for awarding attorney's fees. Taken together,
these suggestions preserve the underlying premise of the substantially prevailed
doctrine, to protect insureds from recalcitrant insurers, while also ensuring fair and
consistent outcomes for all parties involved.
Richard L. Costella
16 342 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1986).
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